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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVI.8W
The only apparent reason for the immunity rule is precedent, and
the precedent in this country is questionable.' 8
Courts are faced with a choice: either to continue to enforce a
common law doctrine of dubious ancestry ' 9 under the drastically
changed circumstances of present day life; 20 or to recognize the rights
of the child by allowing it a cause of action against its parents.2 1
The preferable choice would appear to be to modify the parental
immunity rule by restricting it to the home; 22 and by permitting
recovery in cases where the injury was negligently inflicted by a




publishes a pictorial magazine of nation-wide circulation, displaying
on its cover the registered trade mark "Life" in white block letters
on a red background. In 1947 defendant opened a mail order busi-
ness developing color film, and advertised in photography magazines
under the name of "Life Color Labs." Defendant's title was in black
and white, with the word "Life" given the same prominence as the
other words. Plaintiff sought an injunction and an accounting. Al-
though the parties were not engaged in competing businesses, and it
was unlikely that their products would be confused, Special Term
granted the injunction.i Held, reversed. An injunction will not
18 See note 12 supra. The Mississippi court, which established the prece-
dent for the rule in the United States, either failed or was unable to cite any
sound authority for its position denying suits against parents. The necessity
of the court's statement of the "rule" is also debatable.
19 Ibid.
20 See text at note 12 supra. But see Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425,
430, 40 N. E. 2d 236, 238 (1942).
21 See note 8 supra. But cf. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y. 425, 40 N. E. 2d
236 (1942); Bcehm v. C. M. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113, 63 N. Y. S. 2d
587 (Sup. Ct. 1946); cf. Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885, 887
(1891).
22"Since parental discipline and control and the conduct of the domestic
establishment are at the root of the denial of a cause of action, it would seem
that the denial should at least, be so confined.. ." McCurdy, supra note 4,
at 1080. Cf. Foy v. Noy Electric Co., 231 N. C. 161, 56 S. E. 2d 418 (1949) ;
Wright v. Wright, 229 N. C. 503, 50 S. E. 2d 540 (1948) ; Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950). But cf. Cannon v. Cannon, 287 N. Y.
425, 40 N. E. 2d 236 (1942) ; Thickman v. Thickman, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 284 (Sup.
Ct. 1949). The word "home" could be restricted to include only the actual
physical dimensions of the domicile, or such activities as the members of the
family engage in as a cohesive unit, e.g., a Sunday picnic.
23 Cf. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930) ; Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d 343 (1939) ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166
S. E. 538 (1932).
'Time, Inc. v. Life Color Laboratory, 198 Misc. 1038, 101 N. Y. S. 2d
586 (Sup. Ct. 1950). The court denied the accounting, there having been no
proof of injury or damage to plaintiff.
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issue to protect a trade mark right where the parties are not business
competitors, and where the evidence does not show possible public
confusion of the origin of the products. Time, Inc. v. Life Color
Laboratory, Inc., 279 App. Div. 51, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 957 (1st Dep't
1951).
A common law 2 trade mark right is acquired by the prior ap-
propriation 3 and user 4 of a distinctive,5 fanciful or arbitrary 6 desig-
nation. A word merely descriptive,7 generic 8 or geographical 9 can-
not qualify as a trade mark unless, through extended use, it has
become so associated with a product in the public mind that it may
be said to have acquired a "secondary meaning." 0
2 A trade mark right at common law was entitled to essentially the same
protection as a registered trade mark. In Beckwith v. Commissioner of Pat-
ents, 252 U S. 538, 543 (1920), it was stated: "The Registration Act ...
without changing the substantive law of trade-marks, provided . . . for the
registration of marks ... which, without the statute, would be entitled to legal
and equitable protection...." See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson,
Commissioner, 269 U. S. 372, 380, 381 (1926); Waldes v. International Mfrs.'
Agency, Inc., 237 Fed. 502, 506 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
3 Atlas Beverage Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 113 F. 2d 672 (8th
Cir. 1940) ; Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. Calif. Packing Corp., 63 F. 2d 498 (9th
Cir. 1933); accord, Hygienic Products Co. v. Judson Dunaway Corp., 81 F.
Supp. 935 (D. N. H. 1948), rev'd o other grounds, 178 F. 2d 461 (1st Cir.
1949).
4 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90 (1918) ; Esso,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 98 F. 2d 1 (8th Cir. 1938).
; See Elgin National Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U. S. 665,
673 (1901).
6The mark itself must ordinarily indicate that it has been arbitrarily
selected; it cannot be a mere descriptive term. In Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.
v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 240 U. S. 251, 256, 257 (1916), the Court, referring
to the term "The American Girl" as used to designate a brand of shoes, stated
that the appellation was ". . . fanciful ... arbitrarily selected ... to designate
shoes .... . See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 715, comment c (1938); see
Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948).
7 Caswell v. Davis, 58 N. Y. 223 (1874); Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.
v. Spear & Ripley, 2 Sandf. 599 (N. Y. 1849).
8 Koehler v. Sanders, 122 N. Y. 65, 25 N. E. 235 (1890) ; cf. Ball v. Broad-
way Bazaar, 194 N. Y. 429, 85 N. E. 674 (1909).
9 Canal Co. v. Clark, 13 Wall. 311, 324 (U. S. 1871). "They [geographi-
cal designations] point only at the place of production, not to the producer,
and could they be appropriated exclusively, the appropriation would result in
mischievous monopolies." See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 720 (1938).10 The "secondary meaning" theory ". . . contemplates that a word . . .
originally . . . incapable of exclusive appropriation . . . might nevertheless
have been used so long and so exclusively ... that... the word ... had come
to mean that the article was his product ... "' Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198
Fed. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), aff'd, Saalfield Pub. Co. v. Merriam Co., 23S
Fed. 1 (6th Cir. 1917). Secondary meaning will usually attach to a geo-
graphical term only after protracted association. See Sun Valley Mfg. Co. v.
Sun Valley Togs, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 502 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) (failure to estab-
lish secondary meaning; corporate name). Some words seemingly never ac-
quire a secondary meaning for trade mark purposes. See Skinner Mfg. Co.
v. General Foods Sales Co., 52 F. Supp. 432, 448 (D. Neb. 1943) ("Raisin
Bran': Held, no secondary meaning despite long advertising campaigns and lack
1952 ]
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Formerly, equitable relief was restricted to situations where the
parties were in direct competition," and where the defendant had
"passed off" his goods for those of the plaintiff by use of a decep-
tively similar mark.1 2  "Passing off," however, did not necessarily
imply an intent to deceive the public.18 The gravamen of the pro-
ceeding was the harmful result, rather than the subjective intent of
the defendant. 14
Later cases have shifted the emphasis from the theft of trade, by
use of deceptive markings, to the destruction of good will.15 The
theory has been advanced that a trade mark is a creator of good will,16
rather than a mere identification of the product. Thus, injunctive
relief has been predicated upon the "dilution" or "whittling away" 17
of good will which was established by the long association of the pub-
lic with the plaintiff's mark. Although the parties are not competi-
tors, it is still possible that the public will be confused as to the source
of the defendant's product.' 8  The plaintiff's reputation would thus
be jeopardized since any defects in defendant's product could be asso-
ciated with plaintiff's name.19
of competition in field). The word "Life" appears to be of the type which
acquires secondary meaning if at all only after many years of exclusive use.
See Time, Inc. v. Life Color Laboratory, Inc., 279 App. Div. 51, 52, 107 N. Y. S.
2d 957, 958 (1st Dep't 1951). ".... nor do we think that plaintiff has acquired
a secondary meaning in the word 'Life' in the field of photography to the extent
that its use as part of the name of defendant would constitute unfair
competition."
1 General Baking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 90 F. 2d 241 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 732 (1937); Astor v. West Eighty-Second St. Realty
Co., 167 App. Div. 273, 275, 152 N. Y. Supp. 631, 633 (1st Dep't 1915)
(. ..without competition there can be no unfair competition, and hence no
invasion of any equitable right.").
12 Croft v. Day, 7 Beav. 84, 49 Eng. Rep. 994 (Rolls Ct. 1843) ; see 38 HAxv.
L. REv. 370, 371 (1925) ; 1 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPFTITION AND TRADE-MARKS
40 (2d ed. 1950).
3 Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids Manufacturing Co., 233 U. S. 461 (1914);
Colman v. Crump, 70 N. Y. 573 (1877).
'4Ibid.; see 1 CALLMAN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 73, 74.
15 Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 696 (2d Cir. 1948).
16 See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HIARv.
L. REv. 813, 818 (1927). "To describe a trademark merely as a symbol of
good will, without recognizing in it an agency for the actual creation and per-
petuation of good will, ignores the most potent aspect of the nature of a
trademark ......
'17 Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 317 Ill. App. 451,
46 N. E. 2d 165 (1943); cf. Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147
Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260
N. Y. Supp. 821 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
See Note, 148 A. L. R. 13-125 (1944).
is L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F. 2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934); Armour
& Co. v. Master Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F. 2d 201 (S. D. Ohio 1925);
I. Rokeach & Sons, Inc. v. Atlas Import & Export Corp., 171 Misc. 407, 11
N. Y. S. 2d 864 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
19 See Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 23 F. 2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928);
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There is scant possibility of obtaining injunctive relief on the
theory that a trade mark is, in itself, a property right, and thus a fit
subject for equitable protection. 20 It is well established that a trade
mark is not a "right in gross," and is property only so far as it re-
lates to the good will of an existing business.21
Where neither "passing off," nor an erosion of good will can be
established, equity's reluctance to recognize an absolute property
right in a name or mark will invariably pose an impassable barrier
to relief. It is not surprising, therefore, that the injunction was de-
nied in the principal case. The evidence indicated that there was
no "passing off," and that the parties were not competitors. The
plaintiff had never directly or indirectly participated in the business
of commercial photography. The difference in the color of the ad-
vertisements and the lack of emphasis placed by the defendant upon
the word "Life" also tended to show that there was little chance
of confusion of the origin of defendant's product. While the pos-
sibility exists that the defendant was trading on the established good
will attached to the word "Life," any possible "whittling away" would
be de mininis.22 Nor does the fact that the plaintiff's mark was reg-
istered pursuant to federal statute 23 strengthen his position. Regis-
tration does not per se confer new substantive rights. Equitable prin-
ciples continue to govern the issuance of an injunction, even to
protect the exclusive use of a registered mark.24
It is submitted that the decision in the instant case is sound.
Recognition of an absolute property right in a name or mark would
Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917);
Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 54, 296 N. Y. Supp.
176, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
20 Some of the older cases enjoined partly on the theory of a property right
in the name itself. Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., 4 De G.
J. & S. 137, 46 Eng. Rep. 868 (1863); Hall v. Barrows, 4 De G. J. & S. 15,
46 Eng. Rep. 873 (Ch. 1863). The theory was later repudiated in England.
Reddaway v. Banham, [1896] A. C. 199, 209 (P. C.) ("I doubt myself whether
it is accurate to speak of there being property in such a trade mark. . .."
The property concept of trade mark protection did not find favor in the United
States. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 414 (1916);
Loughran v. Quaker City Chocolate & Confectionery Co., 286 Fed. 694, 697
(E. D. Pa. 1923); Chadwick v. Covell, 151 Mass. 190, 23 N. E. 1068, 1069(1890). The property theory has, however, been advocated by a leading treatise
writer. See 3 CALLmA, op. cit. surpra note 12, at 1009.21 See United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 97 (1918) ; Standard
Oil Co. v. Calif. Peach & Fig Growers, 28 F. 2d 283, 284 (D. Del. 1928).
22 "There is no evidence that defendant's work is inferior or likely to dis-
credit plaintiff if such confusion existed." Time, Inc. v. Life Color Labora-
tory, 198 Misc. 1038, 1039, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 586, 587 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
23 60 STAT. 428 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1652 (1946).
24 "... courts vested with jurisdiction of civil actions arising under this
Act shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the principles of equity
and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable, to prevent the viola-
tion of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent Office."
60 STAT. 438 (1946), 15 U. S. C. § 1116 (1946). See note 2 supra.
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serve no useful purpose. Indeed, the varying interpretations placed
on the term "property" in reference to trade-mark protection would
seem to be distinctions of words rather than substance.25 Whether
trade marks be considered property or not, the need for their pro-
tection is based on harm threatened to business or good will by their
unlawful appropriation. Where such threatened harm is lacking,
there is no valid reason for granting injunctive relief.
25 Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 Fed. 513, 515
(7th Cir. 1913), aff'd, 240 U. S. 403 (1916). 1 NImS, UNFAIR CompEnrIoN
AND TRADE-MARKs 534 (4th ed. 1947).
[ VOL. 26
